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OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
 
MEMORANDUM GC 15-02    February 10, 2015 
 
TO:   All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge,  
     And Resident Officers 
 
FROM: Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel  /s/ 
 
SUBJECT:  Guideline Memorandum Concerning Deferral to Arbitral Awards,  
the Arbitral Process, and Grievance Settlements in Section 8(a)(1)  
and (3) cases 
 
I. Introduction 
In its seminal decision in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,1 the Board decided 
that it would defer, as a matter of discretion, to an arbitrator’s decision in cases 
where the arbitral proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties 
agreed to be bound, and the arbitrator’s decision was not clearly repugnant to the 
purposes and policies of the Act.  After some years of experience applying Spielberg, 
the Board expanded on that test by requiring an arbitrator to have considered the 
unfair labor practice issue (i.e., the “statutory issue”).2  In Olin Corp.,3 the Board 
relaxed the consideration requirement, holding that it was satisfied if the 
contractual and statutory issues were factually parallel and the arbitrator was 
presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.  In 
addition, Olin placed the burden on the party opposing deferral to demonstrate that 
the deferral criteria were not met.4   
 
In Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.,5 the Board revisited Olin and held 
that the existing postarbitral deferral standard did not adequately balance the 
protection of employee rights under the Act and the national policy of encouraging 
arbitration of disputes over the application or interpretation of collective-bargaining 
agreements.  The Board reasoned that the existing standard created excessive risk 
1 112 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1955). 
2 See Raytheon Co., 140 NLRB 883, 884-85 (1963), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 471 
(1st Cir. 1964).   
3 268 NLRB 573, 574 (1984). 
4 Id. 
5 361 NLRB No. 132 (Dec. 15, 2014).  
                                                 
1
Griffin: Legal Issues in Higher Education: Annual Review of Court & Admini
Published by The Keep, 2015
2 
 
that the Board would defer when an arbitrator had not adequately considered the 
unfair labor practice issue, or when it was impossible to tell whether that issue had 
been considered.     
 
In order to adequately ensure that employees’ Section 7 rights are protected 
in the course of the arbitral process, Babcock announced a new standard for 
deferring to arbitral decisions in Section 8(a)(1) and (3) cases.6  In so doing, the 
Board also modified the standards for prearbitral deferral and deferral to grievance 
settlements in these types of cases.  This memorandum explains these new 
standards, describes the circumstances in which they apply to pending and future 
cases, and provides guidance on handling cases that implicate these issues.     
 
II. Postarbitral Deferral 
 
A. Overview of the Babcock Standard and Burden Allocation 
 
 Under Babcock, deferral to an arbitral decision is appropriate in Section 
8(a)(1) and (3) cases where the arbitration procedures appear to have been fair and 
regular, the parties agreed to be bound,7 and the party urging deferral 
demonstrates that: (1) the arbitrator was explicitly authorized to decide the unfair 
labor practice issue; (2) the arbitrator was presented with and considered the 
statutory issue, or was prevented from doing so by the party opposing deferral; and 
(3) Board law “reasonably permits” the arbitral award.8  The meaning of each of 
these three new prongs in the postarbitral deferral test is discussed in more detail 
below.  It is important to underscore that Babcock places the burden of proving that 
the deferral standard is satisfied on the party urging deferral, typically the 
employer, which is another significant change from the Olin standard.9    
6 We interpret Babcock as applying not only to cases involving Section 8(a)(1) and 
(3) discipline and discharge, but also to other Section 8(a)(1) and (3) conduct 
cognizable under a contractual grievance provision.  Such conduct likewise 
implicates employees’ Section 7 rights, and therefore falls within the scope of the 
Board’s policy rationale for adopting new deferral standards. By contrast, the 
processing of Section 8(a)(5) allegations will be unchanged, except where they are 
entwined with related Section 8(a)(1) and/or (3) allegations. See, infra, fn. 50. 
7 These traditional requirements under Spielberg and Olin were not affected by the 
Babcock decision.  
8 Since the Board has now adopted a new postarbitral deferral standard, Regions 
should no longer follow Memorandum GC 11-05 (Jan. 20, 2011), which outlined a 
different proposed framework.   
9 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 10. 
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B. Explanation of the Babcock Requirements  
 
1. Explicit Authorization  
 
 Under Babcock, an arbitrator must be explicitly authorized to decide the 
statutory issue in order to defer to the arbitral award.  This requirement can be met 
by showing either that: (1) the specific statutory right at issue was incorporated in 
the collective-bargaining agreement, or (2) the parties agreed to authorize 
arbitration of the statutory issue in the particular case.10   
 
Significantly, the Babcock standard treats explicit authorization as a 
threshold requirement, that is, deferral is never warranted if this requirement is 
not met.  The Board reasoned that arbitration is a consensual matter and it will not 
assume that the parties have agreed to submit statutory claims to the grievance 
process.  Consequently, each party to a collective-bargaining agreement has the 
prerogative to decide not to arbitrate statutory claims by refusing to agree to a 
contract incorporating the statutory right or to otherwise agree to arbitrate the 
statutory issue.11  That is, a party will retain the option of adjudicating a statutory 
claim before the Board in the event the arbitrator denies the grievance where the 
collective-bargaining agreement is silent as to the statutory right and the party 
refused to authorize arbitration of the claim in the particular case.           
 
CASEHANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:  The Region should submit to the Division of 
Advice any questions about whether a specific statutory right was incorporated into 
the collective-bargaining agreement or whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the 
statutory issue in the particular case.         
 
2. Statutory Issue was Presented and Considered  
 
 The Babcock standard requires that the arbitrator was “actually presented” 
with and “actually considered” the statutory issue in order to defer to an arbitral 
award.12   It therefore abandons Olin’s de facto presumption that “if an arbitrator is 
presented in some fashion with facts relevant to both an alleged contract violation 
10 Id., slip op. at 2, 5.  The Board noted that contract language prohibiting 
retaliation for engaging in union activity would be sufficient to show that the 
statutory right was incorporated in the collective-bargaining agreement in a case, 
like Babcock, where the union argued during the grievance process that the 
employee was discharged for engaging in steward activities.  Id., slip op. at 6, 11. 
11 Id., slip op. at 11.   
12 Id., slip op. at 6, 7, 10, 11 (emphasis omitted).     
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and an alleged unfair labor practice, the arbitrator necessarily was presented with, 
and decided, the latter allegation in the course of deciding the former.”13   
 
 The Babcock Board observed that either party can raise the statutory issue 
before the arbitrator.14  Merely informing the arbitrator of the unfair labor practice 
allegation in a pending charge will usually be sufficient to show that the issue had 
been presented.15   
 
 In order to show that the arbitrator actually considered the statutory issue, 
the Board will require that the arbitrator “identified that issue and at least 
generally explained why . . . the facts presented either do or do not support the 
unfair labor practice allegation.”16  The Board will not require that an arbitrator 
conduct a “detailed exegesis” of Board law, since many arbitrators, as well as union 
and employer representatives in arbitral proceedings, are not trained in labor law.17  
But the Board will not assume that an arbitrator implicitly ruled on the statutory 
issue if the award merely upholds disciplinary action under a “just cause” analysis; 
rather, the arbitrator must make explicit that the action was not in retaliation for 
an employee’s protected activities.18   
 
Although the Board did not explicitly return to the deferral principles set 
forth in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,19 which predated Olin, certain cases decided 
under that earlier standard illustrate Babcock’s “actual consideration” principle.  
For example, in Inland Steel Co.,20 the Board found that deferral to an arbitral 
13 Id., slip op. at 5. 
14 Id., slip op. at 7. 
15 Id., slip op. at 7 n.14. 
16 Id., slip op. at 7.            
17 Id.  Thus, the Board declined to adopt a requirement that the arbitrator correctly 
enunciated the applicable statutory principles and applied them in deciding the 
statutory issue.  Id. 
18 Id., slip op. at 8, 11. 
19 247 NLRB 146, 146-47 (1980) (deferral unwarranted unless the statutory issue 
was both presented to and considered by the arbitrator; no deference will be given 
where arbitral award does not indicate whether arbitrator “ruled on” the unfair 
labor practice issue), overruled as recognized in Altoona Hospital, 270 NLRB 1179, 
1179 (1984).  
20 263 NLRB 1091, 1091, 1097 (1982). 
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award finding “just and proper cause” for an employee’s discharge was appropriate 
where the arbitrator expressly found that the employee was discharged for 
providing false information on her employment application rather than for her 
union activities.  Specifically, the arbitrator reasoned that the employer harbored 
no anti-union animus in light of its longstanding knowledge and tolerance of the 
employee’s union activities and that it merely followed its uniform policy and 
practice of terminating employees for such falsifications.21  In these circumstances, 
the Board observed that the “parties clearly litigated the statutory issue of 
discrimination before the arbitrator and he clearly considered that issue in deciding 
[the] grievance.”22  In contrast, deferral was rejected in cases where the arbitral 
award did not discuss the facts relevant to the statutory issue, did not draw any 
conclusions based on the unfair labor practice evidence presented, or made no 
determination as to the real reason for the employer’s actions.23  Notably, the Board 
also refused to defer in cases where the arbitral award disavowed any intention of 
21 Id. at 1096-97. 
22 Id. at 1091. 
23 See, e.g., Joyce Brothers Storage, 263 NLRB 544, 548-49 (1982) (deferral 
unwarranted where arbitral panel denied grievance without any rationale; no proof 
panel considered whether union activity motivated discharge where hearing 
minutes disclosed no discussion of “factors germane to the statutory issue” and no 
analysis of evidence presented); Phil Smidt & Son, Inc., 260 NLRB 668, 668 n.1, 
670-71 (1982) (deferral unwarranted where arbitral decision merely assessed 
whether reasons given for discharge were supported by the evidence and amounted 
to “just cause”; arbitrator did not consider whether employer’s proffered 
justifications were pretextual or whether employee’s arguably protected attempt to 
document favoritism motivated the discharge); Magnetics International, Inc., 254 
NLRB 520, 520 n.2, 523 (1981) (deferral unwarranted where arbitration decision 
merely recited parties’ contentions and announced that insubordination amounted 
to “just contractual cause,” but did not draw conclusions as to the evidence of 
unlawful motive and did not decide if the legitimate basis for discharge was mixed 
with unlawful considerations), enforced, 699 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1983); General 
Warehouse Corp., 247 NLRB 1073, 1074, 1076 (1980) (deferral unwarranted where 
arbitral decision framed the issue in terms of “just cause,” only discussed 
absenteeism evidence, and did not make findings concerning discriminatee’s 
protected activity of opposing waiver of cost-of-living increase), enforced, 643 F.2d 
965 (3d Cir. 1981); Koppel, Inc., 251 NLRB 567, 569-72 (1980) (deferral 
unwarranted where arbitral decision did not address argument that employer’s 
decision to return employee to the dispatch hall was in retaliation for protected 
complaints about safety and manning; arbitrator’s statement at the hearing that he 
would consider all the evidence and arguments insufficient).  
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deciding the unfair labor practice, but where the arbitrator nonetheless made 
gratuitous comments or findings as to the merits of the statutory claim.24          
 
 The Babcock Board articulated an exception to the above requirements, 
which permits deferral absent presentation and consideration if the statutory right 
is incorporated in the collective-bargaining agreement and one party affirmatively 
prevented the other party from raising the unfair labor practice issue before the 
arbitrator.25  The Board anticipates that this exception will rarely apply.26  
Typically, both parties will be motivated to litigate the unfair labor practice in the 
arbitral proceeding, and the employer will be able to raise the statutory issue if the 
union does not.27  In order to address the concern that unions might withhold 
evidence relevant to the statutory issue during the arbitral proceeding for the 
purpose of defeating deferral, Babcock provides that in the event the issue is placed 
before an arbitrator but a party fails to introduce such evidence, the Board will 
assess whether the arbitral award is reasonably permitted in light of the evidence 
that was before the arbitrator.28  This creates a disincentive against withholding 
evidence in an attempt to avoid an arbitral ruling on the statutory issue if a party 
initially authorized arbitration of the issue and the other party at least raised it in 
the arbitral proceeding.            
 
 CASEHANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:  The Region should submit any questions 
concerning whether the statutory issue was presented to and considered by the 
arbitrator to the Division of Advice.  Likewise, any case where a party argues that it 
was prevented from placing the statutory issue before the arbitrator, including 
24 See B & W Construction Co., 263 NLRB 405, 405 n.3 (1982), enforced sub nom. 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 736 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1984); Professional Porter 
& Window Cleaning Co., 263 NLRB 136, 136-37 (1982), enforced, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (table decision). 
25 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 6-7. 
26 Id., slip op. at 6-7 & n.12.  
27 Id., slip op. at 7 & n.12.  The Board also emphasized that its adoption of this 
narrow exception did not signal a return to Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 
213 NLRB 758, 762, 764 (1974), overruled by Suburban Motor Freight, 247 NLRB at 
146, which held that deferral would normally be appropriate so long as there was a 
mere opportunity to present the statutory issue, even if the record did not disclose 
whether it was raised by the parties or considered by the arbitrator.  361 NLRB No. 
132, slip op. at 7 & n.13.   
28 Id., slip op. at 7. 
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situations where a union waited to file an unfair labor practice charge until after 
the arbitration,29 should be submitted to Advice. 
 
3. Arbitral Award is Reasonably Permitted Under Board Law 
 
 Under Spielberg and Olin, deferral was improper if the arbitral award was 
“clearly repugnant” to the Act, that is, the award was “palpably wrong” or “not 
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.”30  In applying this 
standard, the Board would defer unless there was “no conceivable reading of the 
facts in a given case that would support the arbitrator’s decision.”31  Thus, the 
Board routinely deferred to arbitral awards that were adverse to disciplined or 
discharged employees even if there was “considerable evidence” of an unlawful 
motive.32   
 
The Babcock Board found that the “clearly repugnant” standard failed to 
adequately protect employees’ statutory rights and adopted a new inquiry for 
assessing arbitral awards: whether Board law reasonably permits the arbitrator’s 
decision.  Under this new standard, the award must represent a “reasonable 
application of the statutory principles that would govern the Board’s decision.”33  
The arbitrator need not rule exactly as the Board would have ruled; in other words, 
the Board will not engage in the equivalent of de novo review of the arbitrator’s 
decision.  Rather, the award need only reach a result a “decision maker reasonably 
applying the Act could reach.”34  We interpret the Board’s rejection of de novo 
review to mean that it will give some deference to the arbitrator’s factual findings, 
including credibility resolutions, in determining whether the result is reasonably 
permitted under Board law. 
 
With regard to remedial questions, the arbitrator’s remedy need not exactly 
match the remedy the Board would have imposed, although the absence of any 
29 See id., slip op. at 32 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (questioning whether waiting 
to file an unfair labor practice charge would be considered acting “affirmatively” to 
prevent consideration of the statutory issue in the arbitral forum).  
30 Spielberg, 112 NLRB at 1082; Olin, 268 NLRB at 574. 
31 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 8. 
32 Id. 
33 Id., slip op. at 7. 
34 Id. 
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effective remedy would preclude deferral.35  For example, the Board noted that 
deferral might be proper even if the award allowed the employer to deduct 
unemployment compensation from backpay, which is contrary to Board policy 
concerning backpay offsets.36  We would extend this rationale to cases where an 
arbitrator failed to order the respondent to post a notice, compensate the 
discriminatee for excess Federal and State income taxes paid as a result of receiving 
a lump-sum backpay award covering more than one year,37 or report the 
discriminatee’s backpay allocation to the Social Security Administration,38 or where 
there were other similar remedial deficiencies.   
 
CASEHANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:  The Region should submit to the Division of 
Advice any case where the arbitral ruling on the statutory issue arguably fails to 
satisfy the “reasonably permitted” requirement, such as where an arbitrator places 
no weight on facts critical to the unfair labor practice or misconstrues Board law.  
As to cases presenting remedial deficiencies, the Region may, at its discretion, defer 
whenever the relief granted by the arbitral award is such that the Region would 
have the authority to unilaterally accept it as settlement of the unfair labor practice 
charge.39  The Region should submit to the Division of Advice any case where it 
seeks to issue complaint on the basis that an arbitral remedy is insufficient, 
including cases where the Region wishes to challenge an arbitral award on the basis 
that it failed to provide a notice posting in light of the circumstances of that 
particular case.   
 
C. Application of the Babcock Postarbitral Deferral Standard to Pending 
and Future Cases 
 
The Board indicated that it would apply the new postarbitral deferral 
standard prospectively (“in future cases”) and not retroactively (“i.e., in all pending 
35 Id., slip op. at 7 n.16. 
36 Id. 
37 See Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44 (Dec. 18, 2012), reaffirmed in Tortillas 
Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 8, 2014). 
38 See id. 
39 See Casehandling Manual, Compliance Proceedings § 10592.1 (defining authority 
of Regional Directors to accept backpay settlements agreed to by all parties and 
discriminatees); see also Casehandling Manual, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings 
§§ 10150-10150.2 (outlining the procedure for regional approval of unilateral 
informal settlements). 
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cases”).40  In actuality, the Board has taken a more nuanced, hybrid approach under 
which the new standard will apply to some pending charges (i.e., some charges 
presently on administrative deferral) and the old standard will continue to apply to 
some charges filed after Babcock.  The date the unfair labor practice charge was 
filed is, thus, irrelevant in deciding which standard applies.  Rather, Regions should 
apply the following rules to determine whether to evaluate an arbitral award under 
Olin or Babcock in pending and future cases raising allegations under Section 
8(a)(1) and (3):  
 
• Olin applies if the arbitration hearing occurred on or before December 15, 
2014, the date the Babcock decision issued;  
 
• Babcock applies if the collective-bargaining agreement under which the 
grievance arose was executed after December 15, 2014.41 
 
• If the collective-bargaining agreement under which the grievance arose 
was executed on or before December 15, 2014, and the arbitration hearing 
occurred after December 15, 2014, which standard applies depends on 
whether the arbitrator was explicitly authorized to decide the statutory 
question (either in the collective-bargaining agreement or by agreement of 
the parties in a particular case).  If the arbitrator was so authorized, then 
Babcock applies, even if the Region initially placed the case on 
administrative deferral pursuant to the preexisting standard for 
prearbitral deferral.42  If the arbitrator was not authorized to decide the 
statutory issue, then Olin applies.  
 
Notwithstanding the Board’s statement that, absent explicit authorization to 
arbitrate the statutory issue, it “will not apply the new standards until [contracts 
40 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 13-14. 
41 We would likewise apply Babcock if the grievance arose under a collective-
bargaining agreement that automatically renewed after December 15, 2014 because 
neither party took action to reopen negotiations pursuant to a contractual renewal 
clause.  Similarly, we would apply Babcock if the grievance arose under a post-
Babcock agreement to extend an expired contract for a set term, unless it was a 
temporary extension to allow the parties to continue bargaining over a successor 
collective-bargaining agreement.  In that case, which standard applies depends on 
whether the arbitrator was explicitly authorized to decide the unfair labor practice.     
42 Such cases will necessarily meet the first prong of Babcock, and the Board 
decided that it is therefore appropriate to apply the remaining criteria of the new 
standard because it will not contravene the parties’ settled expectations.  361 NLRB 
No. 132, slip op. at 14.  
                                                 
9
Griffin: Legal Issues in Higher Education: Annual Review of Court & Admini
Published by The Keep, 2015
10 
 
executed prior to Babcock] have expired,”43 we would not treat contract expiration 
as a strict cutoff date for applying Olin.  Specifically, we would apply Olin to any 
grievance arising under a pre-Babcock contract, even if the arbitral hearing 
occurred after the contract’s expiration, assuming there is no explicit authorization 
to decide the statutory issue.  Such an approach best accommodates the Board’s 
rationale surrounding retroactivity.  The Board decided to delay application of the 
new deferral standard in cases where explicit authorization is absent because 
parties relied on the preexisting deferral scheme in negotiating their contracts and 
processing grievances.  In particular, parties had no expectation that deferral would 
be withheld if they did not incorporate the statutory right in their agreement or 
otherwise agree to arbitrate the unfair labor practice.  And they likewise assumed 
that an arbitration award resolving a grievance arising under their contract would 
be assessed under Olin, regardless of whether the arbitration took place before or 
after the contract expired.  Thus, by applying Olin to all grievances that occurred 
during the life of a pre-Babcock contract in cases where the parties did not 
authorize arbitration of the unfair labor practice, our approach gives parties the full 
benefit of the bargain they struck and comports with their settled expectations as to 
whether the resolution of grievances arising under their contract would warrant 
deferral.44   
 
III. Prearbitral Deferral 
 
 The Babcock Board determined that the above modifications to the standard 
for reviewing arbitral awards necessitated a change in the criteria for 
administratively placing a Section 8(a)(1) or (3) charge on deferral pending the 
outcome of the arbitral process, as set forth in Collyer Insulated Wire45 and United 
Technologies Corp.46  Accordingly, the Board will no longer defer cases to the 
arbitral process unless the arbitrator is explicitly authorized to decide the statutory 
issue (either in the collective-bargaining agreement or by agreement of the parties 
43 Id. (emphasis added).  The Board elsewhere references the time period before 
“new contracts are concluded,” id., slip op. at 14 n.39, and appears to conflate the 
expiration of pre-Babcock agreements and the negotiation of post-Babcock 
agreements.  
44 In cases where the Region issued complaint prior to the Babcock decision 
pursuant to the theory that the arbitral award is clearly repugnant under Olin and 
that the Board should adopt a different deferral standard, the Region should 
continue to litigate the case and argue only that the award is repugnant. 
45 192 NLRB 837, 841-42 (1971).  
46 268 NLRB 557, 558 (1984). 
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in a particular case).47  This is because it would be futile to place a case on hold 
pending arbitration if it is clear from the outset that deferral to that ultimate award 
would be improper. 
 
 Although the Board did not indicate whether this new standard would apply 
prospectively or retroactively, we infer that the new prearbitral deferral standard 
will apply only if the new postarbitral deferral standard would apply to the ultimate 
arbitration.  
 
CASEHANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:  With respect to cases currently on Collyer 
deferral, the Region should send letters (template attached) to parties notifying 
them of the Babcock decision, attaching this memorandum, and instructing them as 
to the circumstances under which the new deferral standards may apply.  With 
respect to future charges in which a party raises prearbitral deferral as a defense to 
allegations under Section 8(a)(1) and (3), the Region must take into account which 
standard will apply to the ultimate arbitration in deciding whether to place the case 
on administrative deferral.  In processing such cases, the Region should proceed as 
follows.48   
 
First, the Region should assess whether the statutory right at issue is 
incorporated in the applicable collective-bargaining agreement.  As with 
postarbitral deferral, any questions about whether a specific statutory right has 
been incorporated into the agreement should be submitted to the Division of Advice.  
If it is so incorporated, the Region should place the case on administrative deferral, 
provided all of the other Collyer requirements are met and there is arguable 
47 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 12-13.  Although the Babcock decision only 
discussed this new requirement in the context of Collyer deferral, we assume that it 
would also apply to cases where Dubo deferral is raised, i.e., where the unfair labor 
practice issue is being processed through the grievance-arbitration machinery and 
there is a reasonable chance that use of that machinery will resolve the dispute or 
put it to rest.  See Dubo Manufacturing Corp., 142 NLRB 431 (1963); Memorandum 
GC 79-36, Procedures for Application of the Dubo Policy to Pending Charges, dated 
May 14, 1979, at 1. 
48 In any case where administrative deferral is appropriate, the Region should use 
the attached Collyer or Dubo deferral letters (instead of the Collyer letter appearing 
in the Casehandling Manual, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings Section 10118.6) 
and select the appropriate pattern language relevant to the circumstances of the 
case.  The Collyer and Dubo deferral letter templates in NxGen have been updated 
accordingly. 
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merit.49  Once an arbitration award issues, the Region should assess it under 
Babcock.   
 
Next, if the statutory right is not incorporated in the contract, the Region 
should ask both parties if they will authorize the arbitrator to decide the unfair 
labor practice.  If the parties so authorize, the Region should obtain such 
commitments in writing and place the case on administrative deferral, provided all 
of the other Collyer requirements are met and there is arguable merit.  Once an 
arbitration award issues, the Region should assess it under Babcock.   
 
Finally, if the statutory right is not incorporated in the contract and one or 
both parties refuse to authorize arbitration of the unfair labor practice, how the case 
should be processed will depend on whether the applicable contract was executed 
before or after December 15, 2014, the date the Babcock decision issued.  If the 
contract was executed on or before that date, the Region should place the case on 
administrative deferral, provided that Collyer requirements are met and there is 
arguable merit.  Once an arbitration award issues, the Region should assess it 
under Olin.  After placing the case on deferral, if the Region learns that the parties 
have subsequently agreed to authorize arbitration of the unfair labor practice, the 
Region should keep the case on administrative deferral, but apply Babcock once an 
award issues.  If the contract was executed after December 15, 2014, the Region 
should conduct a full investigation of the merits and issue complaint or dismiss the 
charge accordingly.  If, after issuing complaint, the Region learns that the parties 
have subsequently agreed to authorize arbitration of the unfair labor practice, the 
Region should place the case on administrative deferral and apply Babcock once an 
award issues.50  
49 Arguable merit should be determined based on affidavits from the charging party 
and witnesses within that party’s control.  At the Region’s discretion, it may wish to 
undertake a more complete investigation before deciding whether to defer. 
50 Babcock did not change Board law finding Collyer deferral inappropriate where 
an allegation is “inextricably related” to or “closely intertwined” with “‘other 
complaint allegations that are either inappropriate for deferral or for which deferral 
is not sought.’”  Arvinmeritor, Inc., 340 NLRB 1035, 1035 n.1 (2003) (quoting 
American Commercial Lines, 291 NLRB 1066, 1069 (1988), overruled on other 
grounds by J. E. Brown Electric, 315 NLRB 620 (1994)).  See also Clarkson 
Industries, 312 NLRB 349, 351-52 (1993) (declining deferral as to “closely related” 
allegations where arbitrator lacked authority to fashion an appropriate remedy as 
to one).  Thus, the Region should decline to place a Section 8(a)(5) allegation on 
Collyer deferral if it is closely related to a meritorious Section 8(a)(1) or (3) 
allegation that is non-deferrable (e.g., because Babcock applies and the parties have 
not authorized arbitration of the Section 8(a)(1) or (3) issue).  Where a charge 
concerns allegations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), the Babcock standard applies to 
the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations and the parties have authorized the arbitrator to 
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IV. Deferral to Grievance Settlements 
 
A. The Babcock Standard 
 
Under Babcock, the Board will apply essentially the same deferral standard 
to grievance settlements as it does to arbitral decisions in Section 8(a)(1) and (3) 
cases.  In such cases, it must be shown that: (1) the parties intended to settle the 
unfair labor practice issue; (2) they addressed that issue in the settlement 
agreement; and (3) Board law reasonably permits the settlement agreement.51  In 
assessing whether the negotiated settlement is reasonably permitted, the Board will 
assess the agreement in light of the factors applicable to other non-Board 
settlement agreements, as set forth in Independent Stave Co.52 
 
CASEHANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:  So long as a grievance settlement is 
satisfactory under Independent Stave, the Region may accept a charging party’s 
request for withdrawal of a charge in cases with arguable merit, since such a 
request suggests an intent to settle the unfair labor practice and prosecution would 
not effectuate the purposes of the Act.  Any merit cases where the charging party 
does not withdraw the charge following settlement of the grievance, or where a 
discriminatee objects to the withdrawal, should be submitted to the Division of 
Advice with recommendations regarding whether the parties intended that the 
settlement would resolve the unfair labor practice issue, whether the settlement 
agreement addresses that issue, and whether the agreement meets the 
requirements of Independent Stave.  
 
B. Application of the Babcock Grievance Settlement Deferral Standard to 
Pending and Future Cases 
 
address the statutory issue, Regions should contact the Division of Advice for 
instructions on how to proceed. 
51 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 13. 
52 287 NLRB 740, 743 (1987).  The Board in Independent Stave identified the 
following non-exclusive list of factors to consider in evaluating settlements: (1) 
whether all parties involved agreed to be bound by the non-Board settlement; (2) 
whether the proposed settlement is reasonable in light of the alleged violation, the 
risks of litigation, and the stage of litigation; (3) whether there is any indication of 
fraud, coercion or duress regarding the parties’ settlement; and (4) whether the 
respondent has a history of violations or of breaching previous settlement 
agreements resolving unfair labor practices. 
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Although the Board did not articulate whether the new grievance settlement 
deferral standard would apply retroactively or prospectively, we assume that the 
policy considerations informing the Board’s nuanced approach toward postarbitral 
deferral apply equally to the grievance settlement context.  Thus, we infer that the 
new standard for evaluating grievance settlements should apply in parallel fashion 
as the new standard for reviewing arbitral awards, and should apply in all cases 
where Babcock would have applied had the parties proceeded to arbitration.  The 
Region should apply the following rules to determine whether to evaluate a 
grievance settlement under Babcock or the pre-Babcock deferral standard set forth 
in Alpha Beta Co.53 in pending and future cases raising allegations under Section 
8(a)(1) and (3):  
 
• Alpha Beta applies if the settlement agreement was executed on or before 
December 15, 2014, the date the Babcock decision issued;  
 
• Babcock applies if the collective-bargaining agreement under which the 
grievance arose was executed after December 15, 2014.54 
 
• If the collective-bargaining agreement under which the grievance arose 
was executed on or before December 15, 2014, and the grievance 
settlement was executed after December 15, 2014, which standard applies 
depends on whether the parties intended to resolve the unfair labor 
practice issue via arbitration or settlement.  If the arbitrator was 
explicitly authorized to decide the unfair labor practice issue (either in the 
collective-bargaining agreement or by agreement of the parties in a 
particular case), or the parties intended to settle that issue, then Babcock 
applies.55  As with postarbitral deferral, any questions about whether a 
53 273 NLRB 1546, 1547 (1985), enforced sub nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 
(9th Cir. 1987).  See also Postal Service, 300 NLRB 196, 197 (1990). 
54 As with postarbitral deferral, we would likewise apply Babcock if the grievance 
arose under a collective-bargaining agreement that automatically renewed after 
December 15, 2014 because neither party took action to reopen negotiations 
pursuant to a contractual renewal clause.  Similarly, we would apply Babcock if the 
grievance arose under a post-Babcock agreement to extend an expired contract for a 
set term, unless the extension was a temporary one for the purpose of allowing the 
parties to continue bargaining over a successor collective-bargaining agreement.  In 
that case, which standard applies depends on whether the arbitrator was explicitly 
authorized to decide the unfair labor practice. 
55 Babcock applies in this scenario even if the Region initially placed the case on 
administrative deferral pursuant to the preexisting standard for prearbitral 
deferral.   
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specific statutory right has been incorporated into the agreement should 
be submitted to the Division of Advice.  If the arbitrator was not 
authorized to resolve the statutory issue, and the parties did not intend to 
settle it, then Alpha Beta applies.     
Any questions regarding the implementation of this memorandum should be 
directed to the Division of Advice. 
 
 
Attachments: 
1. Letter – to be sent in all currently deferred cases 
2. a. Collyer deferral letter – Spielberg/Olin and Alpha Beta apply 
b. Collyer deferral letter – Babcock applies 
c. Dubo deferral letter – Spielberg/Olin and Alpha Beta apply 
d. Dubo deferral letter – Babcock applies 
 
 
cc:  NLRBU 
Release to the Public  
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